COMMENTS
CHARTING VAGUENESS SHOALS THROUGH THE NARROWING OF
CORRUPTION STATUTES
Khari L. Cyrus*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine living in a society where the laws on the books are only as
explicit as “Behave well in public spaces, or be subject to a fine.” When in
public spaces you would likely curtail all behavior that you might possibly
think could be considered unruly. In this same society you might also
imagine, or even expect, that those enforcing the laws will have expansive
discretion to determine who will be subject to prosecution for violating the
condition of “behaving well.”1 Now imagine serving in public office, and
being prohibited from “Acting against the interests of constituents.” At first
you might think this is fairly straightforward, and you should conform your
conduct to that of a “good” public official. But very quickly you would find
yourself in a situation where you must act in a way that enrages or
disappoints a segment of your constituency. Did you just violate the law?
What constitutes “acting,” what defines constituent “interests,” and who
even are these constituents? This law prohibiting conduct is so vague that
just about any action might be a violation of the law.
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See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 47–51 (1999) (detailing an ordinance
prohibiting gang members from loitering in public together or with others); Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 359–61 (1983) (describing an ordinance lacking sufficient detail and giving police
broad discretion to determine “credible and reliable” identification); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (declaring vagrancy statute void); Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (detailing an ordinance stating “[i]f three or more people
meet together on a sidewalk or street corner, they must conduct themselves so as not to annoy any
police officer or other person who should happen to pass by.”).
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In the United States, these sorts of broad criminal statutes are often
found unconstitutional.2 These broad and under-defined statutes fail under
a well-developed vagueness doctrine. In the United States, criminal
statutes must have an ascertainable standard of guilt, or they will fall to the
vagueness doctrine.3 This is the premise of the “void-for-vagueness
doctrine,” which is grounded in the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.4 However, if the statute can be saved by a
narrow construction, the court will read the statute narrowly and allow the
law to stand in its curtailed form.5
In the context of government and politics, vague corruption statutes
coupled with broad prosecutorial discretion pose a unique issue.6 Federal
2

3

4
5

6

See, e.g., Morales, 527 U.S. at 60 (holding that the ordinance prohibiting gang member loitering
was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to provide minimal guidelines to govern
enforcement); Kolender, 461 U.S. at 359–61 (finding that an ordinance requiring loiterers to
present “credible and reliable” identification was unconstitutionally vague because it gave officers
too much discretion); Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162 (holding a vagrancy ordinance
unconstitutionally vague because it was too general and encouraged “arbitrary and erratic”
enforcement); Coates, 402 U.S. at 614 (finding an ordinance mandating that groups of three or
more people meeting on a sidewalk must not annoy police or passersby unconstitutionally vague
because it creates an “unascertainable standard”). But see M. Katherine Boychuk, Are Stalking Laws
Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 769, 769–71 (1994) (questioning the
viability of stalking laws given the void-for-vagueness doctrine); Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting
Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex Statutes, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, 245 (2017) (arguing that teen
sex statutes are overly-broad and under-defined, but are permissible despite vagueness doctrine
considerations); Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 1561, 1561–62 (2010) (describing the vague nature of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 and its permissibility
despite vagueness doctrine).
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 100 (1951); see, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
2551, 2557–58 (2015) (finding the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) unconstitutionally
vague because it has no ascertainable standard of guilt); Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544,
544–45 (1971) (per curiam) (finding that a city’s “suspicious persons ordinance” was
unconstitutional because it lacked an ascertainable standard of guilt); see also John F. Decker,
Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws, 80 DENV. U. L. REV.
241, 253 (2002) (outlining the centrality of ascertainability to vagueness doctrine).
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 662 (2012) (finding that the Court must
construe the minimum-coverage provision of the Affordable Care Act as a tax and not a
mandate-with-penalty if they wished to save it from constitutional infirmity); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378
U.S. 500, 515 (1964)) (“‘[A]lthough this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save
it against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the
purpose of a statute . . .’ or judicially rewriting it.”). See generally Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional
Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181 (2009). While courts can
read statutes narrowly, they only do so if the narrow construction is readily apparent. See Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330 (1988) (“[F]ederal courts are without power to adopt a narrowing
construction of a state statute unless such a construction is reasonable and readily apparent.”).
Broad statutes criminalizing actions associated with government and politics may be vulnerable to
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corruption statutes have been consistently challenged for vagueness, and
the Court has frequently narrowed the apparent scope of corruption
statutes in order to address vagueness issues and avoid complete
invalidation of the statute. While the courts work to save vague statutes
from themselves if they are able, they do not go so far as to read something
into the statute that is clearly not there.7 Where do courts draw the line
between vague and sufficiently specific?
In Skilling v. United States, Justice Ginsburg writing for the majority
stated, “[c]onstruing the honest-services statute to extend beyond that core
meaning, we conclude, would encounter a vagueness shoal.”8 Through this
action, the Court found the statute at hand to be permissible on a narrow
interpretation, because to read it any broader would bring it up against a
shoal that would make the law impermissibly vague.
The Court has established no definitive line separating vague statutes
from those that are sufficiently specific. Rather than draw an explicit line,
it appears that the Court has navigated around shoals it wishes to not brush
against. In this Comment, I will follow the narrowing of federal corruption
statutes in an effort to chart these “vagueness shoals”9 that courts use to
box-in otherwise vague laws. In Part I10 I will explore the history of the
vagueness doctrine and how it has evolved into what it is today. This
conversation follows with what the courts consider “vague” and what their
options are upon deciding that a statute is too vague. There is also an
account of why it matters to know how the courts handle vague criminal
statutes, particularly when the subject matter deals with public corruption.
Following a discussion on the vagueness doctrine, Part II will navigate
relevant statutes that shed light on the Court’s process of finding vagueness
shoals.11 The statutes being considered are the honest-services statute,12 the

7

8
9

10
11
12

abuse for political gain. See, e.g., Abby Ohlheiser, How Dinesh D'Souza’s Indictment Became ‘Proof’ of
Obama’s Conservative Inquisition, ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2014/01/how-dinesh-dsouzas-indictment-became-proof-obamas-conservativeinquisition/357351/ (discussing the allegations that President Obama targeted Republican and
Conservative critics through federal indictments).
See Schor, 478 U.S. at 841 (“[The Supreme] Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to
save it against constitutional attack, [but] it must not and will not carry this to the point of
perverting the purpose of a statute . . . .”).
561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010).
Throughout this Comment, I use “vagueness shoals,” “shoals of vagueness,” and “shoals” in
reference to practices, rights, and areas that the Supreme Court will not allow vague statutes to
exist within or govern.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
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bribery statute,13 the extortion statute,14 and the gratuities statute.15 Each
of these sections will explore the background information surrounding the
history and use of these statutes and will show how this connects to the
process of charting vagueness shoals.
Part III is an assessment of the current state of statute narrowing in the
corruption context and explains the benefits of definitively marking the
shoals of vagueness.16 This Part also discusses recent cases dealing with
public corruption – notably the corruption case against United States
Senator Bob Menendez and the overturning of corruption convictions of
former United States House Representative William J. Jefferson. This Part
also discusses vagueness concerns regarding the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act and considers how a potential “void-for-vagueness” challenge might be
resolved in light of the identified vagueness shoals.
I. THE VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
To establish the framework for the exploration of the narrowing of
corruption statutes, a discussion on the history and the subsequent
expansion of vagueness will be discussed below. The discussion will then
turn to theoretical efforts to separate uncertain and vague from precise and
permissible.
A. History of Vagueness
The vagueness doctrine stems directly from the Due Process Clauses in
the Constitution.17 If a law does not give an average citizen sufficient
13

14
15
16
17

Id. at § 201(b). This provision of the United States Code contains multiple sections on bribery.
The discussion in this Comment focuses on the narrowing of the term “official act” as it appears
throughout the bribery statutes.
Id. at § 1951.
Id. at § 201(c)(1)(A). The discussion of gratuities throughout this Comment is centered on the
Court’s definition of the quid pro quo requirement.
See infra Part III.
See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 149 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“As misuse of the
criminal machinery is one of the most potent and familiar instruments of arbitrary government,
proper regard for the rational requirement of definiteness in criminal statutes is basic to civil
liberties. As such it is included in the constitutional guaranty of due process of law.”); see also PAUL
H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, CRIMINAL LAW 65 (2d ed. 2012) (“The vagueness
prohibition is rooted in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution.”). The legality principle acts in a formal way to dictate the process of criminalizing
actions. Id. at 64 (stating that doctrines within the legality principle define “who may create
criminal offenses . . . how they must do so . . . and when the government may punish violations” as
opposed to “what” may be criminalized). The vagueness doctrine makes up one of the pillars of
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information to know what conduct is prohibited or what penalty will follow,
then their ability to conform their actions to the law is inhibited.18
The vagueness doctrine in the United States is used to void laws that a
court deems to be too uncertain or impermissibly vague. Turning back to
the example given in the Introduction about “behaving well in public
spaces,” if someone were arrested under this law, their defense would likely
rest on the vague language of the statute and the inability to conform their
behavior to an ill-defined standard. A law as vague as the one described
would likely be found unconstitutionally vague.
A study of the history of the doctrine shows that it was initially used in
conjunction with First Amendment law as “a way to invalidate laws that
might chill protected speech.”19 However, the doctrine expanded beyond
its initial use as a supplement to protect free speech. Vagrancy laws were
laws passed by cities that criminalized common street behavior and granted
wide discretion to police to enforce those laws.20 In the tumultuous times of
the Cold War and the Civil Rights Movement, these vagrancy laws led to
the widespread arrest and prosecution of persons the police found
undesirable in the community.21 The expansion of the vagueness doctrine
to laws other than those associated with chilling protected speech was
instrumental in overturning vagrancy laws.22 Vagueness arguments were

18

19

20

21

22

the legality principle, a principle that defines criminal law in the United States. Id.
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (citing Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972)) (“[V]oid for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two
connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is
required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so
that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.”).
RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL
90 (2d ed. 2011); see Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499
(1982) (“If . . . the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent
vagueness test should apply.”); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (citing Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509–10, 517–18 (1948)) (“[T]his Court has intimated that stricter
standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially
inhibiting effect on speech . . . .”); see, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871–
72 (1997) (identifying particular concern over the Communications Decency Act of 1996 because
its vagueness poses a chilling effect on free speech).
See Risa Goluboff, The Forgotten Law that Gave Police Nearly Unlimited Power, TIME (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://time.com/4199924/vagrancy-law-history/ (describing the history of vagrancy laws and
their use by law enforcement).
Id. (describing the vagrancy laws underlying the 1949 arrest of Isidore Edelman, a “middle-aged,
Russian-born, communist-inclined soapbox orator” in Los Angeles, CA, and the arrest of
Margaret Papachristou, a “blond, statuesque, twenty-three [year old] . . . Jacksonville native” who
was out with two black men in Jacksonville, FL 20 years later).
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1991) (voiding an ordinance for lack of
clarity on what actions were being criminalized and for legislature’s failure to provide guidelines
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also used in other contexts to challenge laws targeting individuals who were
deemed to be undesirable members of their communities.23
B. What Constitutes Vague?
The process of deciphering vague from permissible is one that is
shrouded in mystery and blurred lines. In his dissenting opinion in Winters
v. New York, Justice Frankfurter described the vagueness doctrine as itself,
vague.24 The lack of a defining principle for vagueness likely stems from
the fact that it comes from flexible language.25 The common explanation
given for the vagueness doctrine is that criminal statutes cannot be “so
vague that individuals of common intelligence must guess at its meaning.”26
This may lay the groundwork, but it is hardly sufficient by itself in
guiding courts to determine whether laws are vague. To complicate
matters more, this is not the only principle guiding vagueness. Writing for
the majority in Nash v. United States, Justice Holmes stated, “[T]he law is full
of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as
the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.”27 This muddies
the water and further complicates vagueness, but also serves as a realistic

23

24

25
26
27

for law enforcement); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (voiding a
vagrancy statute due to its vagueness and utility as a discriminatory prosecutorial tool); Coates v.
City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (voiding a law that prohibits three or more people
from gathering on the sidewalk and engaging in behavior that a passerby might find annoying);
Fred Barbash, Supreme Court Strikes Down Vagrancy Law, WASH. POST (May 3, 1983),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/05/03/supreme-court-strikes-downvagrancy-law/a3fc2b52-f0f2-4f42-82a0-0b64836fe685/?utm_term=.a622b46a8105 (discussing
the Court’s voiding of a San Diego, California vagrancy ordinance).
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Tennessee, 414 U.S. 1163, 1168–69 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (arguing that a criminal statute used to arrest a protester of the Vietnam war
was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to give fair notice of the criminalized conduct);
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 348–51 (1964) (holding that a South Carolina criminal
trespass statute being challenged by a black patron who was arrested for sitting in a segregated
lunch counter was vague and violated the Due Process Clause); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 495–98 (1951) (describing a law criminalizing the spread of communist ideologies and the
subsequent legal challenge).
333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating “‘[Vagueness]’ is not a quantitative
concept. It is not even a technical concept of definite components. It is itself an indefinite
concept.”); see also Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the Void for
Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 259, 261 (2010) (arguing that the
void-for-vagueness doctrine as applied by the Supreme Court lacks a definitive standard).
It is important to note, however, that the flexible language of the vagueness doctrine allows it to
adapt to various factual situations.
Gold Diggers, LLC v. Town of Berlin, 469 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D. Conn. 2007) (citing Connally v.
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
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view of the complexity of the doctrine.28 It raises questions as to when a
law that requires an average citizen to estimate what behavior is
criminalized becomes insufficient due to lack of guiding principles.
Vagueness is also not considered in a vacuum, but is considered in a
context where it is presumed that the statutes passed by Congress are
valid.29
While vagueness guidelines are rather murky, the Supreme Court has
spoken with clarity about vagueness in certain contexts. The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals in State v. Flinn recognized the lack of detailed
guidelines governing vagueness, but found that the United States Supreme
Court had been clear in defining vagueness in terms of “First Amendment
and similarly sensitive constitutional rights.”30
While laws dealing with certain rights are interpreted from the face of the
statute, others require a deeper look to determine their certainty or
uncertainty.31 In addition to being facially vague, statutes can also be vague
as applied.32 A facially vague statute is one that is unconstitutional in all of its
applications.33 Alternatively, laws can be challenged on the basis that they
are vague as-applied, meaning they are unconstitutional given their
application to a specific circumstance.34 This dichotomy in how laws can be
28

29

30

31
32

33

34

For example, fraud statutes have to be sufficiently general to encompass a wide variety of schemes
that are fraudulent in nature, but which are not described with specificity in the statute. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (referring to "any scheme or artifice to defraud" as opposed to describing
specific actions).
See United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963) (“The strong presumptive
validity that attaches to an Act of Congress has led this Court to hold many times that statutes are
not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether
certain marginal offenses fall within their language.”).
State v. Flinn, 208 S.E.2d 538, 543 (W. Va. 1974) (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96
(1940)) (“Statutes governing potential First Amendment and similarly sensitive constitutional
rights will be strictly tested for certainty by interpreting their meaning from the face of the
statutes.”); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1976) (“Where a statute’s literal
scope . . . is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [vagueness]
doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.”).
See Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 32–33 (upholding a statute as sufficiently certain by looking
beyond the face of the statute and evaluating its application to the defendant’s situation).
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236
(1994) (“Conventional wisdom holds that a court may declare a statute unconstitutional in one of
two manners: (1) the court may declare it invalid on its face, or (2) the court may find the statute
unconstitutional as applied to a particular set of circumstances.”).
See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (citing United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)) (“[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge
by ‘establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,’ i.e., that
the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.”).
See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2580 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“‘It is well
established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms
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ruled as vague is helpful in that it places vagueness considerations in one of
two buckets, but it does not necessarily help in defining what vagueness looks
like. The Court has undergone efforts to identify when vagueness challenges
must be considered facially or as-applied, and has based that determination
on whether the challenged law involves a First Amendment right.35
There are some important additional considerations that help mark
what may or may not be vague. One such addition is due process only
requires that the law give “sufficient warning” so that people avoid that
which is prohibited.36 Furthermore, it takes a lawyer’s conclusion after
extensive research to deem a law as vague, not the research or the
understanding of the common citizen.37 Given the potential need for a
trained lawyer to decipher whether a law is vague or not, this doctrine has
been described as disconnected from the lives of ordinary citizens.38 This
removal of notice requirements from ordinary life has led to the argument
that vagueness doctrine inquiries should be in terms of “limiting arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement by police officers and prosecutors” as
opposed to addressing fair notice.39 In fact, the Court has identified that
the prevailing factor in vagueness considerations is the ability for
discriminatory application as opposed to concerns over fair notice.40 By

35
36

37

38

39

40

must be examined’ on an as-applied basis.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)).
See id.
Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) (per curiam); see also Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065,
1075 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that the residual definition of “crime of violence” under the
Immigration and Nationality Act was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to provide
sufficient warning of prohibited conduct); United States v. Sun & Sand Imports, Ltd., Inc., 725
F.2d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that the relevant standard under vagueness was whether the
Flammable Fabrics Act gave sufficient warning and that definitions promulgated under the Act
met the standard); United States v. Speltz, 733 F. Supp. 1311, 1312 (D. Minn. 1990) (finding that
a statute’s failure to define “plant” in its regulation of the growth of marijuana plants did not
render it unconstitutionally vague because it still provided fair warning).
See Rose, 423 U.S. at 50 (“Even trained lawyers may find it necessary to consult legal dictionaries,
treatises, and judicial opinions before they may say with any certainty what some statutes may
compel or forbid.”).
See Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes—Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 1, 5 (1997) ([T]here is something ‘inescapably fictive’ about the [vagueness inquiry
regarding notice]; it focuses on a sort of ‘lawyer’s notice’ that seems far removed from ordinary
life.” (citing John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L.
REV. 189, 211 (1985))).
Id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355–57 (1983); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
574 (1974); Columbia Nat. Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995); StreetWatch
v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1055, 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
See Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574 (stating “perhaps the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine
is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.”); see also Hill v. Colorado,
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focusing their concerns with vague laws to the issue of arbitrary
enforcement, the Court has taken a step towards narrowing vagueness
doctrine and providing guidance on what in fact constitutes a vague statute.
C. Options with Vague Statutes
Courts can save a vague statute from itself rather than void it on
constitutional grounds, and not only do they have the power to do so,41
they have the duty to do so if possible.42 When faced with these statutes,
courts decide between throwing the entire statute out or construing the
statute narrowly, thus allowing it to stand, albeit in a tailored fashion.43
This process of narrowing is not an open delegation of legislative power,44

41

42

43

44

530 U.S. 703, 732–33 (2000) (finding a statute sufficiently specific by evaluating whether the
statute provided law enforcement adequate guidance inhibiting discriminatory application). In its
earlier opinions associated with unconstitutionally vague laws, the fair notice requirement was a
constant thread throughout all of the Court’s considerations. However, this shifted when the
Court began using vagueness doctrine to overturn vagrancy laws. See Lockwood, supra note 24 at
272 (detailing the Court’s decision to switch focus from public notice concerns to arbitrary
enforcement concerns).
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982) (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932)) (“When a federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged as overbroad, it should,
of course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems, if the statute is subject to such a
limiting construction.”); United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 368–70 (1971)
(‘“[I]t is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”’ (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 62 (1932))).
See, e.g., Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 n.24 (“When a federal court is dealing with a federal statute
challenged as overbroad, it should, of course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems,
if the statute is subject to such a limiting construction.” (emphasis added)); Thirty-seven Photographs,
402 U.S. at 369 (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and . . . a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932))
(noting accord with Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 26–27 (1968) (finding that the Court should
read a challenged statute narrowly to avoid constitutional questions))).
See United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973)
(“[The Court’s] task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the
will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations.”); see also Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733, 777 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that facially vague statutes can be saved by a
“narrow[ ] judicial construction.”).
But see Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1485–86 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (casting doubt on the authority of courts to excise or sever unconstitutional portions
of statutes in order to allow the constitutional portions to stand); Skilling, 561 U.S. at 423–24
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (“It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large
enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could
be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the
judicial for the legislative department of the government . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875))).
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but rather an opportunity for the judiciary to fashion the law that was
passed into a state where it does not violate any constitutional provisions.45
To develop this narrowed interpretation, courts turn to the various canons
of interpretation,46 where legislative history carries particular importance.47
Some scholarship suggests that the Court throws out statutes under the
vagueness doctrine in order to create a “buffer zone of added protection at
the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms.”48 This scholarship
looks beyond how courts narrow statutes, and asks when courts make the
determination that a narrowing must occur. The central argument, which
will be explored in Parts below, is that the Court throws out statutes that
venture too close to the freedoms identified in the Bill of Rights. But
beyond those freedoms, there are other areas that the Court also wants to
protect—identified below as vagueness shoals.49
D. Why it Matters to Know the Shoals of Vagueness
Before exploring the narrowing of corruption statutes in order to find
the vagueness shoals the Court considers, it is important to note the
relevance of the vagueness doctrine in the context of public corruption
statutes. Corruption is a pervasive issue and is a concern shared by a large
segment of the United States’ citizens.50 It is a concern that has been
around since the formation of the American political system and has
shaped the framework of our democracy.51 Given the proximity of
corruption to politics, vague statutes that grant wide discretion to police
and prosecutors are a legitimate cause for concern, because these vague

45

46
47

48
49
50

51

See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems . . . .”).
See generally Larry M. Eig, Cong. Research Serv., 7-5700, Statutory interpretation: General
Principles and Recent Trends (2014).
See id. at 45–46; see also Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1954) (finding that the use of legislative history has greatly expanded in the
federal courts).
Student Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75 (1960).
See infra Part III. A.
See generally ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S
SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014); 75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption,
GALLUP (Sept. 19, 2015), http://news.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-governmentcorruption.aspx (describing the high levels of corruption that American citizens perceive in their
government).
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 393 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed. 1987)
(stating that at the Constitutional Convention, “[n]othing was more to be desired than that every
practicable obstacle should be opposed to . . . corruption.”).
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statutes could provide the basis for political prosecution and even greater
levels of corruption.52 While vagueness doctrine is developing in other
contexts,53 this comment focuses solely on vagueness in the corruption
context because of its highly political nature.
The Supreme Court has more closely scrutinized laws that might
infringe upon First Amendment rights and other sensitive freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution.54 Corruption statutes have the potential to
impinge on sensitive rights and freedoms and prevent the expression of
political dissent or unpopular social views.55
Imagine a Democratic wave in an upcoming presidential election, in
which the Democratic Party regains control of both houses of Congress and
the presidency. If this new Democratic government proceeded to write and
pass vague corruption laws and enforce them discriminately against their
Republican colleagues, they could seriously undermine democracy and
cripple the chances of any future challengers. The ability for one political
party to use discriminatory prosecutorial discretion made available by
vague statutes is a troubling thought.
While a scenario as extreme as the one described above is unlikely to
occur,56 it is worth noting that Congress does indeed pass what some might
call “vague” laws quite often. While this vagueness might not reach the
judicial standard of vagueness, the bills that leave Congress can, at times, be
light on the details. There are numerous reasons why this is the case, and
it’s a mixed bag of good and bad justifications. One reason Congress passes
vague laws lacking detail comes from a practical governance point of view.
By proposing legislation that is not too technical or down in the weeds,
congressmen have a better chance of gaining their colleagues’ support and
52
53
54

55

56

See TEACHOUT, supra note 50, at 11 (“[B]roadly interpreted corrupt intent laws are troubling
[because] . . . they can be used to punish political enemies.”).
See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210–11 (2018) (considering the vagueness doctrine as it
applies to the Immigration and Nationality Act and the clause defining “crime of violence.”).
See supra note 30; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (stating that "significant
encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that compel[ ] disclosure imposes cannot be
justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest" but instead must withstand
“exacting scrutiny.”).
See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text; see also TEACHOUT, supra note 50, at 7 (arguing
that Supreme Court framework has placed civic interest in blocking corruption in opposition to
First Amendment speech rights).
But see Ohlheiser, supra note 6; Allison R. Hayward, Column, The IRS Can Still Silence Political
Dissent, USA TODAY (June 9, 2015, 6:37 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/
06/09/tax-regulation-irs-political-organizations-column/28477359/ (last updated June 11, 2015,
10:49 AM) (describing the IRS under a Democratic administration utilizing vague wording to
target and delay Tea Party applications for tax exempt status).
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seeing the bill become law. Rather than propose a bill with dozens of
stumbling blocks that might trip up potential supporters, an easier path
forward is to write a bill with a high-level of generality that avoids the sticky
issues that might prevent others from supporting it. And in following this
process, members can pass a vague bill that receives broad support across
parties and then portray the legislation as a victory for their side and their
set of views.
There are other justifications for Congress’ propensity to draft and
enact vague legislation. Another consideration is the appetite for Congress
to police its own behavior, or the lack thereof. Regarding public
corruption, the criminal statutes that are passed will undoubtedly apply to
Congress and regulate the way they campaign and govern. Tasking
Congress with criminalizing some of the behaviors that Members
themselves engage in regularly is potentially too tall an order.57 Again,
rather than get down into the details, some might deem it best to stay highlevel and not risk explicitly criminalizing some of the very same practices
they themselves partake in.
Not all justifications have negative intentions. Corruption threatens
democracy,58 and Congress has attempted to root it out from the American
political system through various laws, including those discussed in this
Comment. One of the strongest justifications for passing a vague law in
this context is that Congress is essentially engaged in a balancing act. It
does not want to write criminal statutes that are so specific that they
criminalize the behaviors of a small segment of the population in, perhaps,
a discriminatory way. But it also does not want to pass laws so vague that
there is truly no guiding principle in how to apply it or enforce it. This
leaves Congress writing legislation that fits somewhere in the middle.
Recognizing that people are adaptive and will try to find ways to operate
outside the scope of the law, passing a broader statute can ensure that all

57

58

See, e.g., Natalie Andrews, Anti-Sexual Harassment Legislation Governing Lawmakers Stalled in Congress,
WALL ST. J. (July 17, 2018, 3:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/anti-sexual-harassmentlegislation-governing-lawmakers-stalled-in-congress-1531857273?ns=prod/accounts-wsj
(discussing the issues Congress is facing in reconciling two bills meant to root out sexual
harassment in Congress); Bradley A. Smith, Why Campaign Finance Reform Never Works, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 19, 1997, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB858722905424003000 (“[W]hen it
comes to political regulation and criticism of government, legislators have strong vested interests
that lead them to mistake what is good for them with what is good for the country.”).
See, e.g., International Anti-Corruption and Good Governance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-309,
§ 202, 114 Stat. 1090 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151–52 (2000)) (“Widespread
corruption endangers the stability and security of societies, undermines democracy, and
jeopardizes the social, political, and economic development of a society.”).
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the behaviors Congress wishes to criminalize will fall under the spectrum.
Related to the concerns about Congress passing vague statutes is the
concern that the unelected federal judiciary will fill in the missing details and
essentially create laws.59 By leaving statutes open and vague, the legislature
is granting the courts the power to fill in the gaps and substitute their beliefs
for those of the elected representatives charged with creating laws.60
II. THE NARROWING OF CORRUPTION STATUTES
The sections below will provide discussion on the background and
creation of federal corruption statutes and how the courts have narrowed
their scope throughout time. The statutes discussed are the honest services
statute,61 the federal bribery statute,62 the extortion statute,63 and the
gratuities statute.64
A. Honest Services
This section discusses honest services, its history, and how the courts
have narrowed the statute. Before discussing the narrowing of honest
services, the sections below will chart the creation of honest services and its
official codification in the law. The discussion will then analyze the case
law throughout the statutes history to discover what shoals the courts have
identified, explicitly or implicitly, to help narrow the law.
1. History of Honest Services
Honest services fraud has a history intimately tied to that of the mail
and wire fraud statutes.65 The mail and wire fraud statutes, codified as 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, respectively, have long been effective tools for

59

60
61
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64
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See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine,
81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 407–08 (2008) (arguing that the current scholarship surrounding the
nondelegation doctrine largely ignores the judiciary, the third branch of government); see also
Sasha Volokh, Opinion, How Ambiguous a Statute may Congress Pass?, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/08/31/how-ambiguousa-statute-may-congress-pass/?utm_term=.4587486890d4
(detailing
the
conflict
over
congressional delegations to the judiciary).
Lemos, supra note 59, at 436–38.
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
Id. § 201(b).
Id. § 1951.
Id. § 201(c)(1)(A).
Id. §§ 1341, 1343.
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prosecutors seeking to target fraud and corruption.66 A relevant element in
both mail and wire fraud is a “scheme or artifice to defraud,”67 which is a
broad term that enabled courts to read in other duties and apply the
statutes to schemes to defraud people out of honest services.68 This
expansion of the scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes to include honest
services eventually reached the Supreme Court.
In the Supreme Court case McNally v. United States, the government
brought charges against a Kentucky official who, in selecting the state
insurance agent, devised a plan where he would receive kickbacks through
money paid to companies he partially owned.69 The case was brought on
the argument that he effectively defrauded Kentuckians by depriving the
citizens of their intangible right that the government’s business be
conducted in an honest manner.70 The Court, however, did not agree with
the assessment that the statute protected the intangible right of honest
services.71 Instead, the Court found that the mail fraud statute was
intended to protect people from “schemes to deprive them of their money
or property.”72 With this finding, the Court eliminated the concept of the
intangible right to honest services and stated that if Congress wanted the
statute to go further than just money or property, then it needed to “speak
more clearly than it has.”73
Congress acted on this statement and passed what is now the honest
services statute the following year.74 The statute sought to clarify what
might have not been clear before, that a scheme to defraud could also

66
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73
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See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 772 (1980)
(describing the mail and wire fraud statutes as effective tools of prosecutors to attack fraud);
Christopher M. Matthews, Prosecutors Broadly Use Mail-Fraud, Wire-Fraud Statutes, WALL ST. J. (June
9, 2015, 1:26PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/prosecutors-broadly-use-mail-fraud-wire-fraudstatutes-1433870788 (discussing the use of the mail and wire fraud statutes as a strong tool for
prosecutors).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also id. § 1343 (“Whoever, having devised or intending to
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud . . . .” (emphasis added)).
See, e.g., United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 13–14 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the mail and wire
fraud statutes applied to private sector honest services and this duty could not be defrauded
pursuant to the statutes); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941) (holding
that a scheme to defraud individuals out of public honest services fell within the scope of the mail
and wire fraud statutes prohibition on schemes to defraud).
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 352 (1987).
Id.
Id. at 356.
Id.
Id. at 360.
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402 (2010).
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include a scheme to defraud an individual of their intangible right to honest
services.75 Thus, in 1988, Congress created the modern honest services
statute in direct reaction to the Court’s McNally decision.
2. The Narrowing of Honest Services
From the Skilling decision in 2010 to the McDonnell v. United States
decision in 2016, the Court has continued to narrow the honest services
statute by identifying vagueness shoals that the law cannot run against.
The first opportunity the Court had to rule on honest services following the
enactment of the government statute in 1988 was in Skilling.76
In Skilling, the charge of honest services fraud was against Jeffrey
Skilling, who rose through the ranks of Enron Company to eventually
become its CEO.77 Soon after becoming CEO, Skilling left the company,
and a few months later the company spiraled into financial ruin and
declared bankruptcy.78 A subsequent investigation of what occurred
internally at Enron revealed that company officials were misrepresenting
the health of the company and propping up its value, to the eventual
detriment of the shareholders.79 It was discovered that Skilling himself was
involved in these schemes, and he was later charged with honest services
fraud.80 The Supreme Court in a 9-0 decision on the judgment found that
Skilling could not be charged on honest services fraud, because the honest
services statute only applied to schemes related to briberies and kickbacks.81
This limitation of the statute strictly to schemes to defraud others of
honest services through bribery or kickbacks was a serious curtailing of the
statute. The Court looked to the body of case law prior to the passing of
the statute to determine its core application and found that the core
consisted of bribery and kickback schemes.82
In parsing down honest services, the Court prevented the doctrine from
existing in its expansive manner, and may have revealed a vagueness shoal
in the process. By allowing the increased expansion of honest services, the
75
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18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
561 U.S. 358 (2010).
Id. at 368–69.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 368.
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 407 (2010) (“The ‘vast majority’ of the honest-services
cases involved offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated in bribery or kickback
schemes.” (quoting United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1987))).
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Court would grant prosecutors a catch-all tool to bring charges against a
wide variety of actors for any number of actions.83 By setting outer limits,
the Court made clear their reluctance to allow prosecutors to run wild with
the statute and rely on it for all of their prosecutions. In addition to gutting
the use of the statute as a catch-all measure, it is not difficult to imagine that
the Court saw the potential for an expansive honest services statute with illdefined outer boundaries to run up against other areas, or shoals, the Court
wishes to protect.
Following the decision in Skilling, it was affirmed in United States v.
Blagojevich that honest services only applies to bribery and kickback
schemes.84 In this case, former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich was
convicted under a number of corruption statutes for his actions following
the election of then-President-elect Barack Obama.85 Notably, Blagojevich
wanted to engage in political trading with the President-elect by agreeing to
appoint Obama’s close colleague Valerie Jarrett to his old Senate seat in
exchange for Obama either giving him a cabinet position, persuading a
foundation to hire him with a substantial salary, or finding someone to
donate $10 million to an organization that Blagojevich would run.86
By denying certiorari,87 the Supreme Court allowed the Seventh Circuit
judgment to stand. In reaching the appellate court decision, Judge
Easterbrook described the political trading Blagojevich attempted to engage
in as nothing more than permissible political logrolling.88 The court
reiterated the holding of Skilling, but also explicitly found that honest
services could not possibly extend to something as essential to effective
governance as logrolling.89 This opinion takes the Supreme Court’s Skilling
decision and uses it to chart a potential vagueness shoal—the
criminalization of actions taken by public officials in their efforts to govern.
Allowing the criminalization of political trading by elected officials would
give prosecutors the power to disrupt the political process. The Skilling
decision was an instance where the Court recognized the potential for
prosecutors to use the statute as a catch-all for “bad” behavior and decided
83

84
85
86
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88
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Id. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The possibilities range from any action that is contrary to public
policy or otherwise immoral, to only the disloyalty of a public official or employee to his principal,
to only the secret use of a perpetrator’s position of trust in order to harm whomever he is
beholden to.”).
794 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 733.
Id.
Blagojevich v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1491 (2016).
Blagojevich, 794 F.3d at 736.
Id.
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to constrain how far the law could be applied.
B. Bribery and “Official Act”
The review of the bribery statute below will hone in on “official act”
and how the definition has gone from an expansive definition to one more
tailored to fit within the Court’s vagueness shoals. The discussion begins
with United States v. Birdsall,90 and then traces the narrowing of “official act”
by the Supreme Court and circuit courts. The cases narrowing “official
act” discussed below are United States v. Muntain,91 United States v. Sun-Diamond
Growers of California (“Sun-Diamond”),92 and McDonnell v. United States.93
1. History of Bribery and “Official Act”
Although the American government at its formation had goals of
combatting corruption,94 they did not pass any bribery statute of general
applicability to public officials.95 They passed a statute prohibiting bribes
related to certain members of the judiciary, customs officers, and tax
officers, but did not prohibit bribery of legislators.96 It was not until 1853
that the first federal bribery act of general applicability became law.97 Even
then, Congress included broad jurisdictional language.98
In 1962, Congress passed another federal bribery law in an effort to
“reformulate and rationalize” criminal statutes dealing with government
integrity.99 In this law, Congress gave definition to an “official act,”100 and
in subsequent caselaw the Court acknowledged Congress’ intent to create a
federal bribery law with broadly applicability.101
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233 U.S. 223 (1914).
610 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
526 U.S. 398 (1999).
136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 51, at 393.
See TEACHOUT, supra note 50, at 105.
Id.
See Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 491 n.8 (1984) (citing to Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 81,
§ 6, 10 Stat. 171).
Id.
Id.
“The term ‘official act’ means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought
before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or
profit.” 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (1962).
See Dixson, 465 U.S. at 496 (referring to Congress’ “long standing commitment to a broadlydrafted federal bribery statute [and] its expressed desire to continue that tradition . . . .”).
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2. An Expansive “Official Act”
The case we will consider to set the stage is United States v. Birdsall.102
Birdsall was convicted of illegally selling liquor to Native Americans.103
Following his conviction, it was discovered that Birdsall bribed two special
officers appointed by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.104 These officers
were responsible for advising the Commissioner on whether judicial
clemency would advance the efforts of the Commission,105 and by paying
these individuals off, Birdsall attempted to influence the message they
would send to the Commissioner regarding clemency.106 While the trial
court found that a bribery conviction was not warranted given that the law
did not prohibit the acts,107 the Supreme Court found that Birdsall’s giving
of money to his co-defendants in an effort to influence them in their official
positions was illegal and constituted a bribe.108 In this case, the Court took
an expansive view of “official act” by finding that an official act includes
“[e]very action that is within the range of official duty . . . .”109 They also
held that an official act need not be explicitly written down as a statute or a
regulation, but could be something as informal as a settled or common
practice.110 The Court would proceed to narrow this definition in
subsequent cases.
3. The Narrowing of “Official Act”
While the Supreme Court narrowed “official act” in Sun-Diamond111 and
McDonnell, circuit courts engaged in their own narrowing process along the
way. One such example is seen in Muntain, a 1979 case before the D.C.
Circuit.112 Charles Muntain was the Assistant to the Secretary for Labor
Relations for the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”).113 While serving as a public official, he was
involved in a scheme to sell group car insurance to labor unions as a benefit
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233 U.S. 223 (1914).
Id. at 229–30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 228–30.
Id. at 227.
United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223, 235–36 (1914).
Id. at 230.
Id. at 231.
See infra notes 120–129 and accompanying text.
United States v. Muntain, 610 F.2d 964, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Id.
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in union contract negotiations.114 To support this scheme, Muntain would
travel across the country, often times on official business, and promote the
group insurance to labor officials.115 For his efforts, he would receive a
portion of any commission that might be generated.116 Muntain was
convicted of receiving things of value in exchange for an official act, and
appealed to the D.C. Circuit.117
On appeal, the court held that Muntain did not engage in any “official
acts” in furtherance of his scheme. The framed the “official act” inquiry by
stating that “the determinative factor is whether Muntain’s actions involved a
matter or issue that could properly, by law, be brought before him as
Assistant to the Secretary for Labor Relations at HUD.”118 Finding that the
promotion of group car insurance is not a matter that could be brought
before him in his role, the court concluded that no official act took place.119
Although the Supreme Court in Birdsall held that an “official act” includes
every action that is within the range of public duty, the Circuit Court
narrowed that broad view by engaging in an inquiry of what fell within the
public duties of the Assistant to the Secretary for Labor Relations at HUD.120
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of “official act” in 1999 when it
heard Sun-Diamond.121 Sun-Diamond Growers Association was a trade
association that was charged with giving then-Secretary of Agriculture
Mike Espy illegal gratuities.122 It was alleged that Sun-Diamond had an
interest in not only persuading Secretary Espy to adopt a particular
regulatory definition that would benefit the association’s members but also
getting the Department of Agriculture to convince the Environmental
Protection Agency to abandon a proposed rule that would be detrimental
to the interests of the association.123 The District Court convicted SunDiamond of giving illegal gratuities, the conviction was reversed by the
Circuit Court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.124

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id. at 966.
Id. at 966–67.
Id. at 966.
Id. at 967.
United States v. Muntain, 610 F.2d 964, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Id.
Id. at 967 n.3 (mentioning four other circuit courts that have engaged in a similar narrowing effort).
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
Id. at 400–01.
Id. at 401–02.
Id. at 403-04.

286

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:1

Although Sun-Diamond was before the Court primarily on gratuities
grounds,125 the Court used the opportunity to further define “official act.”
The Court considered the level of detail provided by Congress in defining
“official act” in the statute and reasoned that this detailed description must
require reference to a particular “official act” and not just any action taken by
an office holder in the course of executing their duties.126 Taking this a step
further, the Court acknowledged that some actions taken by office holders
involve “’official acts’ in some sense” but are not “’official acts’ within the
meaning of the statute. While the Court in Birdsall found that an “official act”
is “[e]very action that is within the range of official duty,”127 the Court in SunDiamond held that not every “official act” is subject to the bribery statute.128
The Court narrowed the scope of “official act” by finding that only
certain types of actions were relevant in the context of the federal
corruption statutes. By limiting “official act” to specific actions, the Court
reasoned that it would be possible to “eliminate the absurdities” that would
arise if prosecutors were allowed to bring charges against an official for any
act.129 To hold otherwise, the Court noted, would result in nothing but the
government’s discretion preventing the prosecution of absurdities.130
The vagueness shoal preventing prosecutors from using broad language
in a statute as a catch-all seems to be at play in this unanimous decision.
Prosecutorial discretion serving as the only check on the enforcement of
vague criminal statutes does not seem to be something the Court is willing
to rely on, particularly when prosecutors have a catch-all mechanism that
enables them to go after just about any action. The limitation of which acts
by public officials are subject to the bribery statute may also be an
indication that the Court is hesitant to allow the prosecution of certain
behaviors necessary for governance, but this shoal is not explicit in the
Court’s reasoning.
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See infra Section II.C.2.
Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 405–06.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
The Court specifically identifies (1) replica jerseys given by champion sports teams each year to
the President during their visit to the White House, (2) a high school principal gifting a school
baseball cap to the Secretary of Education because the Secretary visited the school, and (3) a
group of farmers providing a free meal to the Secretary of Agriculture when the Secretary is
giving a speech to the farmers regarding matters of United States Department of Agriculture
policy. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 406–07. Although all of these actions are performed in an
official capacity, they are not official acts subject to the statute. Id. at 407.
Id. at 408.
Id.
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The next case that charts the narrowing of “official act”—and one that
provides great context for identifying vagueness shoals—is McDonnell. This
is a case involving bribery charges against former Virginia Governor
Robert McDonnell for his acceptance of gifts from Virginia businessman
Jonnie Williams, as well as McDonnell’s work establishing programs at
Virginia’s public universities that would benefit Williams.131 When
Governor McDonnell was charged with honest services fraud and
extortion,132 the government alleged that he had committed five official
acts, thus making him subject to the statutes.133 At trial, the Government
requested that “official act” be defined in the jury instructions as follows:
The term “official action” means any decision or action on any question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be
pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in
such public official's official capacity. “Official action” as I just defined it
includes those actions that have been clearly established by settled practice
as part of a public official's position, even if the action was not taken
pursuant to responsibilities explicitly assigned by law. In other words,
official actions may include acts that a public official customarily performs,
even if those actions are not described in any law, rule, or job description . .
. . In addition, “official action” can include actions taken in furtherance of
longer-term goals, and an official action is no less official because it is one
in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end.134

McDonnell requested that the court instruct the jury that routine activities
and settled practices such as “arranging a meeting, attending an event,
hosting a reception, or making a speech are not, standing alone, ‘official
acts,’ . . . because they are not decisions on matters pending before the

131
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McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361–65 (2016).
Id. at 2365.
The “official acts” were as follows:
(1) arranging meetings for [Williams] with Virginia government officials, who were
subordinates of the Governor, to discuss and promote Anatabloc;
(2) hosting, and . . . attending, events at the Governor’s Mansion designed to encourage
Virginia university researchers to initiate studies of anatabine and to promote Star
Scientific’s products to doctors for referral to their patients;
(3) contacting other government officials in the [Governor’s Office] as part of an effort to
encourage Virginia state research universities to initiate studies of anatabine;
(4) promoting Star Scientific’s products and facilitating its relationships with Virginia
government officials by allowing [Williams] to invite individuals important to Star
Scientific’s business to exclusive events at the Governor’s Mansion; and
(5) recommending that senior government officials in the [Governor’s Office] meet with
Star Scientific executives to discuss ways that the company’s products could lower
healthcare costs.
Id. at 2365–66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Proposed Jury Instructions of the U.S. at 54, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783
(E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:14-CR-00012).
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government.”135
The trial court decided not to give McDonnell’s instructions to the jury
and he was convicted.136 McDonnell appealed his conviction to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, challenging the trial courts jury instructions
regarding “official act,”137 and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower courts
decision.138 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.139
In considering the text of 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3),140 as well as precedent
and constitutional concerns, the Court found that the government’s broad
interpretation was incorrect and the Court adopted a “more bounded
interpretation of ‘official act’” 141
While the Court formally utilized canons of statutory interpretation to
narrow down the definition of “official act,”142 there are also vagueness
shoals that help explain how they got to its decision.143 The Supreme Court
did not grant certiorari in the Blagojevich case and did not take the
opportunity to consider the criminalization of efforts to govern as a
vagueness shoal.144 But in ruling on McDonnell, the Court acknowledged the
same concern that Judge Easterbrook pointed out in Blagojevich – that some
actions taken by public officials are necessary in their efforts to govern.145
And on a similar theme, the Court recognized the substantial concern
that vagueness in this context could lead to citizens “shrink[ing] from
participating in democratic discourse.”146 It could be that the vagueness
shoal preventing the criminalization of efforts to govern might be related to
another shoal, the chilling of the rights guaranteed under the First
Amendment. A vague law whose use could have a chilling effect on

135
136
137
138
139
140

141
142
143
144
145

146

McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2016).
Id.
Id. at 2367.
Id.
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 891 (Mem).
“The term ‘official act’ means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought
before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or
profit.” 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2367–68 (2016).
Id. at 2368–69 (using the “familiar interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, ‘a word is known by the
company it keeps’” to narrowly define the words “question” and “matter” in the statute).
Id. at 2368–69.
See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
Id.; see also McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372 (“The basic compact underlying representative
government assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents and act appropriately on
their concerns . . . .”) (emphasis in the original).
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
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participation in the democratic process may be seen as entering a vagueness
shoal. One criticism of the prosecution of Governor McDonnell was that
he was being targeted because he was a high profile, popular Republican
politician.147 This fits directly with reasons why the Court narrows statutes,
so that the federal government cannot crackdown on those with dissenting
opinions, or even create the perception of a crackdown. A vague law that
can be used to arbitrarily prosecute dissenters or chill participation in the
democratic process crashes into the First Amendment, and the Court might
see this as an opportunity to narrow the law to prevent this collision with a
vagueness shoal.
Another issue raised by the Court, one that could be an explicit shoal, is
their concern about an expansive definition of “official act” and its impact
on federalism.148 A vague law that can be read to apply federal standards
to an area within state jurisdiction might be subject to narrowing by the
courts to preserve the principles of federalism.
Finally, “official act,” as defined by the government, would give
prosecutors a powerful and unchecked power. The expansive definition
covering almost every action by any public official could be used as a catchall tool with only the government deciding when its use is appropriate. And
criminal statutes cannot be construed on the assumption that prosecutors
will “use it responsibly.”149
C. Extortion and Gratuities
The journey to discover vagueness shoals can also be seen in the Court’s
consideration of cases related to both the gratuities statute150 and the
extortion statute.151 The cases, McCormick v. United States152 and Evans v.
147

148

149
150
151

See, e.g., Ohlheiser, supra note 6 (questioning the motives behind the Obama administrations
prosecution of his critics). During the McDonnell trial, lawyers for Governor McDonnell raised
questions about why this Republican Governor was being prosecuted on an untested legal theory
for actions that were no different than his Democratic predecessor. Defendant Robert F.
McDonnell’s Motion #1 Motion for Discovery of Selected Recordings of Communications
Between Prosecutors & Members of the Grand Jury, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp.3d
783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:14-CR-12). They also raised the issue that the investigation of the
Governor, an investigation riddled with leaks, took place during a hotly contested election to
replace McDonnell and effectively sidelined him from any involvement in the campaign of his
potential Republican successor. Id.
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016) (finding that “[it is the State’s]
prerogative to regulate the permissible scope of interactions between state officials and their
constituents.”).
Id. at 2372–73 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010)).
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2012).
Id. § 1951.
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United States153 discuss the Court’s operation within extortion statutes and
how statute narrowing may not be as necessary in this space as it is in
others. A revisiting of United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California154
highlights other vagueness considerations before the Court.
1. Extortion
Extortion has its roots in state common law and was defined by
Blackstone as a failure of trust by “taking, by colour of his office, from any
man, any money or thing of value, that is not due to him, or more than his
due, or before it is due.”155 Extortion under the Hobbs Act, codified as 18
U.S.C. § 1951, can take the form of extortion under color of official right or
extortion by force, violence, or fear. Extortion under color of official right
is the type most associated with prosecuting corrupt public officials.
Robert McCormick was a state politician in West Virginia when he was
indicted with five counts of violating the Hobbs Act.156 McCormick was an
advocate for a West Virginia program that allowed foreign medical school
graduates to practice in the state under temporary permits while preparing
for the state licensing exam.157 Under this program, some medical students
practiced for years under the temporary permit although the continuously
failed the licensing exam.158 When conversations about ending the
program began to circulate, McCormick introduced legislation to extend
the program and met with a lobbyist to discuss introducing a bill the
following session to permanently address the issue.159 During his reelection
campaign, McCormick informed the lobbyist of the costs of the campaign
and indicated that he had not heard from any of the foreign doctors.160
Through the lobbyist, the doctors provided cash to McCormick on four
separate occasions, and then paid him a fifth time after he was reelected
and passed a law supporting the interests of the foreign doctors.161

152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
TEACHOUT, supra note 50, at 115–16 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *142).
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 261 (1991).
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id.
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Regarding extortion, the district court judge instructed the jury as
follows:
In order to find Mr. McCormick guilty of extortion, you must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the payment alleged in a given
count of the indictment was made by or on behalf of the doctors with the
expectation that such payment would influence Mr. McCormick's official
conduct, and with knowledge on the part of Mr. McCormick that they
were paid to him with that expectation by virtue of the office he held.162

The jury convicted McCormick of violating the Hobbs Act and the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s jury instructions.163
On appeal the Fourth Circuit also held that there is no explicit quid pro
quo (this-for-that) requirement under the Hobbs Act and the government
need not prove that money given to a public official outside of campaigning
was given in exchange for an official act.164 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed.165
The Supreme Court found that, in the context of campaign contributions,
there is an explicit quid pro quo requirement to show that a public official
extorted someone.166 Writing for the majority, Justice White stated:
Whatever ethical considerations and appearances may indicate, to hold
that legislators commit the federal crime of extortion when they act for the
benefit of constituents or support legislation furthering the interests of some
of their constituents, shortly before or after campaign contributions are
solicited and received from those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment
of what Congress could have meant by making it a crime to obtain
property from another, with his consent, “under color of official right.”167

To find contrary would enable prosecution of actions that had long been
seen as legal and that are inevitable given our system of private campaign
contributions.168
The following year, the Court revisited extortion under the color of
official right when it heard Evans. In this case, a Georgia man served as an
elected member of the Board of Commissioners of DeKalb County,
Georgia.169 In an investigation into alleged public corruption in the Atlanta
area, an FBI agent posed as a real estate developer and spoke on the phone

162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 265 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 265–66.
Id. at 266–67.
Id. at 273–74.
Id. at 272.
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272 (1991).
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 257 (1992).
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with the public official on a number of occasions.170 The agent asked the
public official for help in rezoning a particular tract of land, and paid the
official $7000 in cash and wrote him a $1000 check for his campaign. The
official reported the check, but not the cash.171 The official was charged
with extortion and was convicted at trial.172
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
courts ruling, and added that:
[P]assive acceptance of a benefit by a public official is sufficient to form the
basis of a Hobbs Act violation if the official knows that he is being offered
the payment in exchange for a specific requested exercise of his official
power. The official need not take any specific action to induce the offering
of the benefit.173

The Supreme Court agreed with this statement of the law and affirmed.174
In reaching its decision, the Court considered the common law origins of
extortion and found that Congress had expanded the federal extortion law
beyond its original use rather than narrow it.175 The Court further found
that the public official need not start the relationship with the extorted
party and that the word “induced” in the definition of the statute does not
equate to “initiate.”176 Ultimately, in contrast to narrowing trends, the
court held that “the Government need only show that a public official has
obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the
payment was made in return for official acts.”177
This is an instance where the Court has not gone down a narrowing
path, because the statute does not appear to collide with any vagueness
shoals. The one area where a conflict might exist is in the context of First
Amendment rights and campaign donations, but the Court in McCormick
found that quid pro quo had to be shown, thus adding a layer of protection
around the First Amendment freedoms.
Although United States v. Enmons is not a case about extortion under the
“color of official right,” it still sheds light on some narrowing aspects of
corruption laws.178 In Enmons, the Court considered the balance of federalism
and how Congress deals with the issue when criminalizing actions. In this
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 259.
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260–61 (1992).
Id. at 266.
Id. at 268.
410 U.S. 396, 411–12 (1973).
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case, members of the Gulf States Utilities Company were on strike and were
seeking new collective bargaining agreements.179 The employees were
accused of conspiring to obstruct commerce, and through their conspiracy,
they would commit acts of violence to convince Gulf States Utilities
Company to comply with their terms.180 In furtherance of their conspiracy,
five acts of violence were committed—firing rifles at three company
transformers, draining oil from a transformer, and blowing up a transformer
substation.181 The government sought charges under the Hobbs Act,182
claiming that the employees’ actions fell within the scope of the act because
they used extortion and violence to interrupt interstate commerce.183
The district court, in hearing the government’s arguments, was
unconvinced that the Hobbs Act truly extended to the actions of the
employees.184 When the case made its way to the Supreme Court, it was
ultimately swayed by the arguments of the district court.185 The Court
ultimately stated:
[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to
have significantly changed the federal-state balance. Congress has
traditionally been reluctant to define as a federal crime conduct readily
denounced as criminal by the States. . . . [W]e will not be quick to assume
that Congress has meant to effect a significant change in the sensitive
relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.186

This case sheds light on the way the Court considers federalism and
how that might be a basis for narrowing a vague law. When faced with a
statute that is vague and does little to outline what exactly is prohibited, the
Court might question whether the vague law can disrupt the balance that
has been stricken between the federal government and the states. States
and the federal government can often conflict, and the Court has to deal
179
180
181
182

183
184
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Id. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 398.
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (“Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce
or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts
or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in
furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.”).
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 398–400 (1973).
United States v. Enmons, 335 F. Supp. 641, 646 (E.D. La. 1971) (“The union had a right to
disrupt the business of the employer by lawfully striking for higher wages. Acts of violence
occurring during a lawful strike and resulting in damage to persons or property are undoubtedly
punishable under State law. To punish persons for such acts of violence was not the purpose of
the Hobbs Act.”).
Enmons, 410 U.S. at 411–12.
Id. at 411–12 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
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with that balance. For example, states and the federal government both
sue each other, state leaders criticize federal leaders, and vice versa. For
these reasons, and the various other conflicts between the federal
government and the states, the Court narrows corruption statutes so that
they do not set federal standards for state issues and enable federal officials
to prosecute state politicians based on these standards.
These line of cases help to distinguish one of the potential vagueness
shoals the Court has pulled out in their narrowing of “official act,” that
broad laws that can be read to criminalize accepted means of governing are
impermissible. While a vague law cannot stand if it can be read to
criminalize political behaviors such as logrolling or scheduling meetings,
that prohibition does not extend to laws criminalizing what society might
deem as “bad behavior.” Federalism plays a role in this calculation,
because if a state law finds certain behavior permissible but a vague federal
law could be used to prosecute that behavior, the Court may see that as
grounds to narrow. However, in the case of practices like extortion, which
is not accepted by any state and has long been prosecuted under the
common law, a vague federal law allowing for the prosecution of this
behavior would not run into any federalism issues.
2. Gratuities
The facts of Sun-Diamond are detailed above.187 The Court had the
opportunity in this case to not only address what counts as an “official act,”
but to also narrow the scope of the gratuities statute. At trial, the district
court instructed the jury that the gratuities statute did not require a
connection between the gift givers intent and a specific official act.188 The
Supreme Court found this interpretation to conflict with the text of the
statute, which prohibits gratuities given or received “for or because of any
official act performed or to be performed.”189 Ultimately, the burden is on
the government to prove “a link between a thing of value conferred upon a
public official and a specific official act for or because of which” the thing
was given.190
The Court justified their view by looking to the text of the statute and
determining which reading made the most sense, one that required a

187
188
189
190

See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text.
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 406 (1999).
Id.
Id. at 414.
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connection to a particular act or one that did not.191 The framework of the
text, along with the belief that Congress could have and would have
explicitly stated that no connection to a specific act was necessary if that is
what it intended, led the Court to hold that a gratuity is illegal when it is
given or received because of a particular official act.192
Finally, the Court considered the absurd effects a broad law would have
on the regularly conducted business of public officials.193 Allowing a vague
law to be used to criminalize gift giving to public officials, with no
consideration of what in particular the gift was meant to do, would limit the
involvement of citizens in their government. A vague law in this space
could chill public involvement with public officials, and might put in place a
barrier between citizens and their government leaders. If citizens are afraid
to give public officials anything at all for fear of being prosecuted, and
public officials are afraid to accept anything based on that same fear, then
this vague law would have successfully undermined some of the protections
guaranteed under the First Amendment.
III. MOVING FORWARD POST-MCDONNELL AND SUN-DIAMOND
The sections below provide a concise summary of the vagueness shoals
in existence and how they might interact together to create a consistent
doctrine that allows the courts to manage vague laws. This Part will also
discuss the recent action in both the Senator Robert Menendez corruption
case and the Representative William Jefferson case. It will also address
vagueness concerns related to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
consider the vagueness shoals to determine the potential outcomes of any
future “void-for-vagueness” challenges.
A. Charting Vagueness Shoals
As seen through the narrowing of corruption statutes through the cases
outlined above, the courts have utilized vagueness shoals as a method to
trim down overly broad laws. These impermissible shoals, including catchall statutes, infringing on the rights guaranteed under the First Amendment,
undermining federalism, and criminalizing commonly accepted behaviors
and practices used in efforts to govern could be woven together to paint a
picture of how a vague corruption law might be curtailed.
191
192
193

Id. at 406.
Id.
See supra note 128.
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A great first inquiry would be whether the law could be used as an
unchecked catch-all tool to prosecute a wide number of officials. If the only
thing preventing the government from engaging in arbitrary enforcement is
their own discretion, then courts might look to limit a laws application. Of
course, prosecutorial discretion is an important part of our criminal justice
system, so discretion alone will not be enough for a court to find a law too
vague. But if that discretion is coupled with a vague term or phrase in a
statute that allows prosecutors to bring charges against virtually anyone,
with no forewarning of who might be covered by the statute, then a court
might look for ways to narrow the law. To do that, they could turn to the
other shoals.
Asking whether the law infringes on the freedoms guaranteed by the
First Amendment is a good next step in paring down the statute. When
considering a statute challenged on vagueness grounds, courts can look to
see whether the statute could be extended in a way that allows the arbitrary
prosecution of those with dissenting opinions. Moreover, if this statute
could have a chilling effect on participation in the democratic process, the
Court might narrow the law in a way that prevents potential collisions with
the First Amendment. This shoal is particularly relevant in the context of
public corruption, given the proximity of corruption laws to government
and politics.
Once a court has identified a statute’ns use as a potential catch-all and
has narrowed it to avoid First Amendment shoals, it can consider whether
there are any federalism issues at play. Perhaps the best way to approach
this shoal is to determine whether it is possible for federal standards of
proper behavior to be applied to state and local officials, in contradiction
with their own state or local rules dictating what is proper. If a court finds
that Congress has not made it explicitly clear that they want to alter the
federal-state balance on an issue and its prosecutors that are running with a
vague law to alter that balance, then a court might narrow the law to avoid
the federalism shoal. If Congress is explicit in their intention to alter the
federal-state balance and dictate what is proper behavior of a public official,
then that statute would not be subject to vagueness shoal narrowing.
Finally a court would consider whether the corruption law could be
extended to criminalize behavior or actions that are commonly viewed as
proper for effective governance. It is unclear by which standard the court
will determine whether an action is considered proper for effective
governance. In some instances like extortion, where the action has long
been criminalized, the courts will find that no issue arises. On the other
end of the spectrum, vague corruption laws that criminalize activities like
logrolling and political horse-trading, activities that have long been

Oct. 2018]

CHARTING VAGUENESS SHOALS

297

accepted, will be narrowed to allow the continued use of those activities.
Courts might rely on what was criminalized under the common law to
determine if federal criminalization of certain acts is acceptable, even if the
underlying law is vague? But where will courts look to determine what is
“long accepted?” If this shoal is considered by United States Court of
Appeals, it could result in various different standards as the circuits look to
what actions are commonly accepted by the states in their jurisdiction.
B. Utility of Charting Vagueness Shoals
Charting vagueness shoals allows Congress to envision the types of ways
that their statutes might get interpreted in the courts. Given the heavy lift
involved in passing legislation, Congress may prefer to write a law the first
time around that adequately reflects their intentions and can also withstand
judicial scrutiny. A knowledge of vagueness shoals on the front-end could
lead to Congress getting the law “right” the first time and prevent the need to
revisit and tweak the law around the edges in response to the Court’s rulings.
While prosecutors are likely aware of the best practices to argue
corruption cases, knowing the shoals of vagueness could serve as an added
benefit. By identifying these shoals explicitly in communications with
courts, government lawyers can defend their use of corruption laws that
may be challenged for vagueness.
Charting these shoals also allows an opportunity for scholars and
practitioners alike to review recent actions in corruption cases to determine
what role, if any, the shoals of vagueness had on a particular court’s
decisions. Recent actions that could benefit from a shoals discussion
include the Senator Menendez corruption case194 and the recent vacating
of corruption convictions against former Representative Jefferson.195 While
neither of these cases shed light on vagueness shoals, it is possible to see
how the shoals are part of the conversation.
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United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606 (D.N.J. 2018); see also Nick Corasaniti & Nate
Schweber, Corruption Case Against Senator Menendez Ends in Mistrial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/nyregion/senator-robert-menendezcorruption.html?_r=0 (reporting on the Senator Menendez mistrial).
United States v. Jefferson, 289 F. Supp. 3d 717 (E.D. Va. 2017); see also Rachel Weiner, Judge Lets
Former Louisiana Congressman William Jefferson out of Prison, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/judge-lets-former-louisiana-congressmanwilliam-jefferson-out-of-prison/2017/10/05/8b53619e-aa0b-11e7-850e2bdd1236be5d_story.html?utm_term=.8d06f3e02535 (reporting on legal developments on
former Representative Jefferson’s corruption convictions).
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1. Senator Menendez
Bob Menendez was the senior Democratic Senator representing the
state of New Jersey when he, along with his friend Dr. Saloman Melgen,
were indicted by a grand jury on April 1, 2015 on a number of public
corruption charges.196 Notably, Menendez was charged with bribery for
seeking out flights and financial contributions in exchange for “official
act”197 – a term that was narrowed in McDonnell.198
In their trial brief, the government detailed lavish trips that Menendez
took, paid for by his friend Melgen.199 These trips included private jets and
first class travel to resorts in the Dominican Republic and a high-end hotel
in Paris, France that cost over $1,500 per night.200 The government argued
that Menendez did not pay Melgen back for these gifts with money, but
instead used “official acts” through his position as a United States Senator
to return the favor.201
For example, Menendez provided assistance in getting Melgen’s
girlfriend a visa to the United States after her visa request was initially
denied.202 Menendez was also accused of pressing the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to drop their demand that Melgen pay $8.9 million in overbillings
back to the government for payments he improperly received.203
Menendez’s advocacy on behalf of Melgen’s interests, the government
argues, was made in exchange for a $600,000 donation made to Majority
PAC, a Super Pac supporting Democratic Senate candidates, earmarked
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United States v. Menendez, 109 F. Supp. 3d. 720, 724–25 (D.N.J. 2015). The corruption counts
in the indictment relating to Menendez were as follows:
(1) Count One charged Menendez with conspiracy to commit bribery and honest
services wire fraud;
(2) Counts Three through Eight charged Menendez with bribery for seeking out and
receiving private flights in exchange for official acts;
(3) Counts Nine through Eighteen charged Menendez with bribery for seeking out and
receiving financial contributions in exchange for official acts; and
(4) Counts Nineteen through Twenty-One charged Menendez with honest services fraud.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 140–141 and accompanying text.
United States’ Trial Brief at 3–5, United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d. 606 (D.N.J. 2018)
(No. 2:15-CR-155).
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 5–6 (alleging that Menendez made calls to government officials to have Melgen’s girlfriend
re-interviewed by a different interviewing agent).
Id. at 6–8.
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for New Jersey.204
In response to the government’s allegations, Menendez argues that the
government fails to allege any “official act.”205 According to Menendez,
the government is relying on a “stream of benefits” theory claiming that
Menendez received gifts and donations in exchange for future advocacy for
Melgen’s priorities, if the opportunity arose.206
After a nine-week trial, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the
counts charged in the indictment.207 Menendez moved for a judgment of
acquittal on the counts.208 The trial court granted the motion in part and
denied it in part.209 While the government has stated they will not retry
Menendez,210 vagueness shoals could have played a factor in any
subsequent appeals following trial.
A “stream-of benefits” theory by the government would not likely be
used to turn the underlying statutes into catch-all tools. Under this theory,
money and gifts flow towards the public official with the expectation that
when the time comes, the public official will take actions to benefit the one
providing the benefits. A specific set of circumstances would need to be
present for the government to bring charges under this theory, thus closing
the door on its use as a catch-all. It is also understood that limitations on
how much citizens can donate to politicians are permissible, so it is unlikely
that a court would find that a “stream of benefits” theory allows the statute
to infringe on First Amendment rights. The theory does not call into
question issues of federalism or criminalizing commonly accepted efforts to
govern. If the “stream of benefits” theory came before an appellate court,
it is likely that its use would stand.
2. Representative Jefferson
William Jefferson was a nine-term Congressman representing the
Second Congressional District of Louisiana in the House of Representatives
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Id. at 11–13.
Defendant’s Response to the Government’s Trial Brief at 2, United States v. Menendez, 291 F.
Supp. 3d. 606 (D.N.J. 2018) (2:15-CR-00155).
Id.
Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d. at 611.
Id.
Id.
Colin Dwyer, Justice Department Won’t Retry Sen. Menendez After Corruption Case Mistrial, NPR (Jan. 31,
2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/31/582143169/justice-departmentwont-retry-sen-menendez-after-corruption-case-mistrial.
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when he was indicted in 2007 on corruption charges.211 The government
alleged that Jefferson solicited and received payments from various entities
in exchange for promoting their business interests.212
The government alleged that Jefferson agreed to promote Vernon
Jackson’s telecommunications company abroad in exchange for money and
shares of the company.213 Jackson signed a contract with Jefferson’s familyowned marketing company and transferred over a total of 550,000 stocks in
the telecommunications company.214 Jefferson in turn promoted Jackson’s
company abroad by meeting with high-ranking West African officials,
negotiating agreements, and arranging meetings with governmental
agencies.215 In order to ensure the vitality of the agreements he helped
arrange, Jefferson determined that he needed the support of Nigeria
Telecommunications Limited (“NITEL”).216 To get this support, he offered
a bribe to the Nigerian Vice President in exchange for the Vice President’s
help in persuading NITEL to support Jefferson’s endeavors.217 Jefferson
received the bribe money from a domestic partner who was working with
the FBI and agreed that the money she was providing would be used to pay
the bribe.218 Two days later, the FBI searched Jefferson’s home and found
the money stashed in his freezer.219
Jefferson was convicted on eleven counts and appealed his conviction to
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,220 which affirmed his conviction on all
counts except one.221 Jefferson was sentenced to thirteen years in federal
211
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United States v. Jefferson, 289 F. Supp. 3d. 717, 721 (E.D. Va. 2017). The corruption counts in
the indictment were as follows:
(1) Count One charged Jefferson with conspiracy to solicit bribes, commit honest services
wire fraud, and violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act;
(2) Count Two charged Jefferson with conspiracy to solicit bribes and commit honest
services wire fraud;
(3) Count Three and Four charged Jefferson with solicitation of bribes;
(4) Counts Five through Ten charged Jefferson with self-dealing and bribery-related
honest services wire fraud;
(5) Count Eleven charged Jefferson with foreign corrupt practices; and
(6) Count Twelve through Fourteen charged Jefferson with money laundering related to
bribery.
Id. at 725–26.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 722.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 723.
United States v. Jefferson, 289 F. Supp. 3d. 717, 723 (E.D. Va. 2017).
Id.
Id. at 723–24.
Id. at 727.
Id.
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prison,222 but appealed his convictions following the Supreme Court’s
decision in McDonnell, arguing that the acts upon he was convicted are no
longer criminal.223
The trial court found that in some instances, the jury had sufficient
evidence and information to base a guilty verdict on despite the erroneous
definition of official act,224 but in other instances it did not.225 One
conviction that was upheld was Jefferson’s violation of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (“FCPA”), which warrants further discussion to decipher what
role vagueness shoals could have played if the FCPA were challenged as
unconstitutionally vague.
C. Vagueness Concerns of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
While broad criminal statutes are often found to be unconstitutional,
there are some statutes were vagueness appears to be, for the time being,
permissible.226 One such statute relating to public corruption is the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act.
The FCPA is a federal law that criminalizes U.S. companies for
engaging in foreign bribery and mandates certain record keeping
requirements.227 Regarding bribery, the statute prohibits U.S. companies
from bribing “foreign officials” to induce them to influence the decisions of
a “foreign government or instrumentality thereof.”228 Relevant to the
vagueness discussion is the statute’s prohibition on bribery—particularly
who counts as a “foreign official” and what constitutes a “government
instrumentality.”229 The Department of Justice has adopted an expansive
interpretation of the two terms, allowing for broad enforcement.230
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United States v. Jefferson, 289 F. Supp. 3d. 717, 721 (E.D. Va. 2017).
Id. at 741–42.
Id. at 736–37, 738–39.
See Boychuk, supra note 2; Godsoe, supra note 2; Kerr, supra note 2.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1–3, 78ff (1999).
Id. § 78dd-2(a)(1).
See Matthew W. Muma, Note, Toward Greater Guidance: Reforming the Definitions of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2014) (discussing the “vague” and “problematic”
definitional terms within the FCPA). The statute itself defines a “foreign official” as follows:
The term “foreign official” means any officer or employee of a foreign government or
any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such
government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such
public international organization.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A).
Id. at 1340 (citing Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly
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The FCPA has not seen many vagueness challenges in courts,231 likely
because of the high level of settlement involved when the government
brings charges.232 But despite the government’s success in prosecuting,233
there are still concerns over whether the FCPA is in fact precise enough to
withstand vagueness challenges.234 The outer boundaries of the statute
have not solidified, and this fluidity has led to claims that the law in its
current state leads to too much discretionary enforcement, a claim that has
roots in the vagueness doctrine.235 Without commenting on the likelihood
of a future vagueness challenge, it is possible to anticipate how a court
might view the challenge and whether a narrowing to avoid vagueness
shoals is necessary. This is possible by using the vagueness shoal framework
discussed above.236
The first inquiry is whether the government is using, or has the
potential to use, the allegedly vague law as a catch-all tool. It has been
alleged that the government has failed to provide sufficient guidance so that
it can maintain broad enforcement powers without unnecessarily boxing
itself in.237 An expanded scope for the FCPA can be compared to the once
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Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 533–34 (2011)).
See Mike Koehle, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 994 (2010) (discussing
the development of FCPA law outside the judicial process).
See Stuart H. Deming, The Potent and Broad-Ranging Implications of the Accounting and Record-Keeping
Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 500–01 (2006)
(describing how the vast majority of FCPA cases are quickly settled).
See Joel M. Cohen, Michael P. Holland & Adam P. Wolf, Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official
Anyway?, 63 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1267 (2008) (“Because of the financial and reputational harm that a
public FCPA prosecution can cause, nearly all companies targeted by the DOJ and SEC have
opted for quick settlements of their FCPA disputes.” (footnote omitted)).
Id. at 1263–64 (describing a potential vagueness challenge to a provision of the FCPA and the
merits of such a challenge). Not all courts see this as a vagueness issue, but rather see the FCPA
as an ambiguous statute that simply must be interpreted. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738,
746 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that the FCPA’s provisions are “amenable to more than one
reasonable interpretation” and should be subject to the practices governing the interpretation of
ambiguous statutes).
See DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND
TRANSACTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 649 (2010) (“The challenge of [an] FCPA practice lies in part
in the fact that there is little in the way of public precedents on the subject, and the FCPA itself is
complex and, in many areas, vague.”).
See supra Section III.A.
See, e.g., Charles M. Carberry et. al.,DOJ/SEC’s Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Jones Day Summary and Analysis, JONES DAY (Dec. 2012), https://www.jonesday.com/
DOJ_SEC_Resource_Guide_to_FCPA/ (“Perhaps most important . . . is to understand what the
document does not say. Certain questions are . . . left unanswered. Many of these are matters of
judgment while others are areas that the DOJ and SEC simply chose to leave vague, giving the
government the most discretion possible in later . . . actions.”).
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expanding scope of mail and wire fraud statutes.238 As prosecutors began to
rely heavily on mail and wire fraud to achieve many of their goals, the
Supreme Court eventually stepped in and limited the expansion.239 It is
possible that a court would see the FCPA in a similar light and find that it
has the potential to be used as a catch-all.
The next inquiry would ask whether the FCPA infringes on freedoms
granted by the First Amendment. Being able to engage in the political
process is tied in closely with the Freedom of Speech, but being able to
participate in a foreign country’s political process is not something that
warrants the same protection by the courts. A vague law that has the
potential to chill American participation in a foreign country’s government
is likely not going to narrowed on First Amendment grounds.
Federalism issues likely would not play a large role in a court’s
consideration, especially given that bribery is not something that any state
government currently endorses. With the FCPA, the federal government is
not dictating what is proper in contradiction to state government. It is
instead in alignment with state governments in the idea that bribing foreign
officials is bad for government.
The FCPA is also not criminalizing commonly accepted actions
necessary in efforts to govern. The bribing of foreign officials is likely not
something that people would consider necessary for governing. Some
people might see payments expediting decision-making as generally
acceptable, but the FCPA allows for “greasing-the-wheel” in some sense by
not criminalizing payments to move along the process, so long as those
payments are not influencing the substance of the decision.240
Given the shoals of vagueness identified, the FCPA likely will not be
struck down or narrowed on vagueness grounds. Although the statute may
be subject to use as a catch-all tool by prosecutors, it does not crash into the
other shoals that a court might use to conduct the actual narrowing process.
A vague law that can be used to restrict a company’s ability to send bribes
to foreign officials does not collide with First Amendment rights or cross
over into the spectrum of the federal government setting standards on what
constitutes “good government,” in opposition to the standards of state or
local governments. A court is also unlikely to find that the law criminalizes
commonly accepted actions necessary for effective governing.
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See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b).
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While I do not believe that a court would narrow the FCPA based on
the shoals I have identified, any subsequent narrowing and the justifications
behind it will shed light on other vagueness shoals that courts consider.
CONCLUSION
The vagueness doctrine serves an important role in criminal law in the
United States and ensures that individuals receive due process. Our
criminal justice system relies on prosecutorial discretion, and this discretion
itself is not problematic. But when the discretion is coupled with vague
statutes that enable arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, there is
cause for concern. It is not unreasonable to question why the Court has
continued to narrow corruption statutes and tweak them around the edges,
as opposed to simply finding that Congress was too vague in writing the
laws in the first place. However, if the Court intends to continue its
practice of narrowing rather than invalidating, it will be useful to know the
process it takes in going about its narrowing. Charting vagueness shoals is
one way to piece together the Court’s justification in narrowing federal
corruption statutes.

